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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
Motor Vehicle Theft Act, 41 Stat. 324 (1919), 18 U. S. C. 408, for induc-
ing another to steal an airplane and fly it from Illinois to Oklahoma "in
interstate commerce." The act states that "the term motor vehicle when
used in this section shall include an automobile, automobile truck, auto-
mobile wagon, motor cycle, or any other self-propelled vehicle not de-
signed for running on rails." On appeal by defendant, who contended
that an airplane does not come within the meaning of the statute, the con-
viction was affirmed, one judge dissenting. The phrase "any other self-
propelled vehicle not designed for running on rails" includes an airplane.
McBoyle v. United States (C. C. A. 10, 1930) 43 F. (2d) 273. The court
states that it recognizes the principle of construction that a generic
phrase following an enumeration refers only to situations or things ejusdem
generis. An airplane is compared to an automobile in that both serve the
same general purpose, are propelled by gasoline motors, and both run
on the ground, "an airplane partly." It is submitted that the compari-
son made is so fragile as to result in a virtual rejection of the doctrine
in this case. In fact, an inclusive definition of "vehicle" found in the
Century Dictionary is the main reliance of the majority. The decision
seems in conflict with the prevailing rule that a penal statute is to be
construed strictly, 1 Bl. Comm. 89; 25 R. C. L. 1081-1084; and to be lim-
ited by ejusdem generis whenever possible, First National Bank of Ana-
moose v. United States (C. C. A. 8, 1913) 206 F. 374.
Nor does the opinion show a common sense effort to pick out the
objects which probably were in the legislative mind. Radin, Statutory
Interpretation (1929) 43 HARv. L. Rav. 863. Ejusdem generis as a canon
of interpretation, it is true, has been worn thin by numerous decisions,
mostly recent. It is well-known that it is overlooked when necessary to
accomplish a desirable broadening of a statute. Section 40 of the Tariff
Act of 1922, 42 Stat. 948 (1922), 19 U. S. C. Sec. 231, classes an airplane
as a "vehicle," and planes used in smuggling liquor have been released
under the heading of "vessels or vehicles seized under any revenue law."
In re Jackson (N. D. N. Y. 1929) 35 F. (2d) 931. The instant deci-
sion, however, is one in which the desirability of making interstate air-
plane thefts punishable in Federal courts is at least questionable. The
matter might well have been left to Congress, whose specific inclusion of
airplanes, had such been intended, would not have been difficult in the
first place. The fact that most airships are closely watched at commercial
ports, are more easily identified than automobiles, and are less easily
concealed, would seem to except them from the obvious purposes which
rendered the statute necessary in the case of automobiles. The greater
mobility, ease of transit and disposition of motor cars presented a prob-
lem too extended for the states to handle, but this can hardly be said
of the airplane. F. R. R., '31.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-AWARD FOR DISFIGUREMENT.-In a recent
Missouri decision the loss of 31 teeth was held a proper basis for addi-
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tional award for permanent disfigurement although the injured employee
had received compensation for the period he was absent from work, and
had been re-employed at his old wage. Bety v. Columbia Telephone Co.
(Mo. App. 1930) 24 S. W. (2d) 224.
The Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act sec. 17 (a) enumerates 46
specific injuries causing permanent partial disability and provides that
compensation, measured proportionately, shall be paid for other injuries
where "such other injuries shall include permanent injuries causing a
loss of earning power." The purpose of this sentence, because of its
context, is obscure. In the principal case the court refuses to take the
view that injuries are compensable only where there is a loss of earn-
ing power. The court bases its position on the fact that among the spe-
cific injuries set forth are some which would not necessarily result in a
loss of earning power, and "where a statute enumerates various injuries
which are compensable unconditionally, and is immediately followed by
a provision for 'other injuries,' the last injuries provided for will be read
as ejusdem generis with and not of a kind different from those specifically
named."
The New Jersey Workmen's Compensation Act contains the following
provision: "In all other cases in this class the compensation shall bear
such relation to the amount stated in the . . . schedule as the resulting
disabilities bear to those produced by the injuries named in the schedule."
N. J. Laws 1911, p. 138. In construing this provision the word "disability"
has been held to authorize compensation for injuries which do not reduce
earning capacity. De Zeng Standard Co. v. Sheridan Pressey (1914) 86
N. J. Law 469, 92 Atl. 228; Burbage v. Lee (1915) 87 N. J. Law 36, 93 Atl.
859; Hercules Powder Co. v. Morris County Court (1919) 93 N. J. Law 93,
107 Atl. 433.
In Centlivre Beverage Co. v. Ross (1919) 71 Ind. App. 343, 125 N. E.
220, however, the court held that "disability" in a similar provision meant
diminution of earning power. Thereupon, by amendment to the'Indiana
act, the word "disability" was replaced by the word "impairment" In
Edwards Iron Works v. Thompson (1923) 80 Ind. App. 577, 141 N. E.
530, the change was held to be significant, since "disability" means inability
to work while "impairment" means loss of a function, and held that com-
pensation for a permanent partial "impairment" need not be based upon an
impairment of earning power.
The construction placed on sec. 17 (a) of the Missouri act in the in-
stant case places Missouri in line with other states in allowing awards for
disfigurements. Such awards, however, are quite generally based on pro-
visions allowing award for any serious and permanent disfigurement of
the hand, head, or face. This type of provision occurs in many statutes
of which the following are typical: R. S. La. (Marr, 1915) sec. 3967 sub.
1 (e), amended, La. Acts 1924, no. 216; Utah Comp. Laws (1917) sec. 3138,
amended, Utah Laws 1919, c. 63; Pa. Stats. (1920) sec. 21995, amended,
Pa. Acts 1921, no. 966. L. 0. C., '31.
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